"my AR pages"-index
The term 'animal/s' is often used on this site as
indicating an underlying philosophical definition, as being contrasted by the term 'human'.
Different- or other-than-human-animals
We partly use the term 'different-than-human-animal/s',
which can operate in indicating a possible zone inbetween a bios-centered
definition and a philosophically relatively independent AR definition.
When forms of discrimination of
nonhuman-animal-individuals by humans, on the not-just-human-centered political scope,
are talked about, we prefer to use the term 'nonhuman animal/s'.
allows to highlight the problematic connection between "giving a position
and giving a definition", in general, as how its applied in regard to
animals when seperated from certain exclusionary ranges of human
self-attributions and also when used to probably seperate from ethical purpose.
This problematic connection can also be seen
from the angle of the affected side as "being given a position and being
given a definition".
The connection of 'human' given positions and 'human'
given definitions affects nonhuman animals for example in the question relating
to what can be construed under the term of 'self-authority'.
Standing under the situation of "being
given and position and a definition", self-authority is set as an
externalized factor to nonhuman animals.
The exclusionionary character of that
enforced passivity (or not-allowing of self-determination) limits the
interest-political side potentially as then being dependent on human
In front of the backround of an overall or
interspecies relation-context, this aspect would generally locate itself on the
The problem of "bios"-centeredness
We do know that it is very superficial and
insufficient to speak of 'rights' and then just refer to 'some' biological data
talk mostly within this context here, instead of addressing e.g. philosophical
and conceptual roots of the oppression of nonhuman animals, and other issues
that deal with causes etc etc...
The pattern of outlooks and attitudes of humans,
into which nonhuman animals have been placed by strict definitions, is so tighly
woven in the discriminatory form, that currently it seems extremely hard to break the veil of
disregard in this respect.
The word "Bios" --
definition cited from: http://ancienthistory.about.com/library/bl/uc_bakaoukas4a1.htm
But why do the verbs "ZO" (=I am alive, I exist) and "EBION"
(=I lived my life in a specific way) have different content, although they have
a common etymological root? The difference between the two forms, the present
tense "ZO" and the second past tense "EBION" is a tense but,
at the same time, also a genuine semantic alteration of the common root "gui-".
In a way the root of the second past tense "EBION" expresses a meaning
slightly different from the meaning of the present tense "ZO". The
past tense "EBION"and the derivative noun "BIOS"
were constructed in order to indicate a new notion about life, a notion more
concrete and specific: i.e., the constant purposive and therefore complete,
unchangeable way of life, to live a life, as Aristotle says, in a concrete
mental way (kata tina noun 1180a17 Nicomachean Ethics) "BIOS
is a moral action" (bios
praxis estin 1254a7 Eudemian Ethics; 1333a31 Politics).
to Stephanus, "BIOS"
does not mean just life (zoe)
but a specific kind of life (bios
kai to eidos tes zoes; Stephanus, Allia attulit Sallier. Ad Thomam M.
Significationes vocabuli exponit Etymol. M. , p. 198, 13). That is to say,
is a lifetime (bios
o chronos tes zoes; Stephanus ibid.). It is a rational life and therefore cannot
be attributed to animals (Stephanus, De discrimine inter bion et zoen sic
praesipit Ammonius, p. 30, et similiter Eranius Philo p. 164 et Thomas M. p.
zoes diapherei men epi ton logikon tassetai zoon, toutestin anthropon monon).
different practical estimation about life was expressed by the second past tense
"EBION" and the derivative noun "BIOS". QUOTATION
The American Anti-Vivisection Society