Animal Knowledge

Animal Knowledge

Palang LY

This text as a PDF (Link opens in a new window)

It’s astonishing, why are we willing to accept that the burden of proof lies with the nonhuman animals and their allies, to make clear who they are, when a human-centred society doesn’t even have the will and ability to see the full spectrum. Why do we, their allies, bow in to human methods of research on things that can’t be proven and that don’t have to be proven?

Their individual life’s dignity does not need to be proven; it needs to be acknowledged, without restrictive conditions.

What the AR community should learn is to claim the rights, the foundation of dignity, the freedom that really lies outside of paradigms that were (and are) installed to quite contrarily draw lines as aggressive borders.

We tie our human standards and insights on a.) language and b.) on our specific capacity to utilize nature, and we see both these things as qualifiers that are intertied: Language plus the capacity to utilize nature as a resource!

It never occurs to us that other beings could have a more sustainable and clearly wise concept of how to live on planet earth, that their ancestral relation over millions of years has given them insight on how to interact in other ways with nature and their natural environment.

We would deny that, because we don’t accept that nonhumans have concepts. We think concepts can only occur with certain qualifiers … , and we think that nature couldn’t have possibly taught nonhuman animal ancestors things they decidedly built their cultures on.

We think nonhuman animals don’t decide these things.

I could go on, but my point is that we as AR people err so bad, because we don’t want to take the stance that would make us jump in the cold water of radical new perspectives in terms of: de-humanfocusing and thus deconstructing sources we refer to as basis of knowledge about life.

We keep putting new wine into old bottles when we don’t come up with a new architecture of basic knowledge.

 

Dr. Vandana Shiva: Wie das Wirtschaftswachstum zu etwas Lebensvernichtendem geworden ist

Die Göttin Ma’at von Farangis G. Yegane.

Wie das Wirtschaftswachstum zu etwas Lebensvernichtendem geworden ist

Eine Sucht nach Wachstum hat unsere Sorgen über Nachhaltigkeit, Gerechtigkeit und menschliche Würde in den Hintergrund gedrängt. Menschen sind aber keine Wegwerfware – der Wert von Leben liegt außerhalb der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.

Dr. Vandana Shiva (http://www.navdanya.org/)

Dieser Artikel ist im The Guardian vom 1. November 2013 veröffentlicht: How economic growth has become anti-life, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/01/how-economic-growth-has-become-anti-life.

Übersetzung: Palang LY, mit der freundlichen Genehmigung von Dr. Vandana Shiva.

Unbegrenztes Wachstum ist die Fantasie von Ökonomen, Unternehmen und Politikern. Man betrachtet es als Maßstab von Fortschritt. Hieraus hat sich das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP), das angeblich das Wohl einer Nation bemißt, sowohl als die mächtigste Variable als auch als das herrschendste Konzept unserer Zeit hervorgetan. Dennoch trägt das Wirtschaftswachstum verborgen in sich die Armut, die es durch die Zerstörung der Natur verursacht, die widerum zur Folge hat, dass Gemeinschaften außerstande sind, für sich selbst zu sorgen.

Das wirtschaftliche Wachtstumskonzept wurde als ein Maßstab eingesetzt um während des Zweiten Weltkriegs Ressourcen zu mobilisieren (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_production_during_World_War_II#Gross_domestic_product_.28GDP.29). Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt fußt auf der Schaffung einer künstlichen, imaginären Grenze, die unter der Annahme funktioniert, dass, wenn einer etwas produziert das er selbst konsumiert, er eigentlich gar nichts produziert. Tatsächlich bemisst das „Wachstum“ die Umwandlung von Natur zu monetären Werten und von öffentlichem Gut zu Handelsgütern … DIESEN ARTIKEL ALS PDF WEITERLESEN (Link öffnet sich in einem neuen Fenster).

 

Animal Thealogy: Man-Machine? Animal Reason!


Io – Farangis G Yegane

Animal Thealogy:

Man-Machine? Animal Reason!

Palang LY

This text as a PDF (link opens in a new window)

The basic question about the categorical division into (nonhuman) “animals” and “humans” (Homo sapiens), brings up probably before the question of its moral implications, the question about what exactly hides beneath both these big generalized identities.

Why has the view about that what-animals-are and that what-humans-are finally lead to us only viewing animals under biological terms today?

Is it enough to attribute only an instinctual behaviour to nonhuman animals?

Is it thus the ‘fault’ of animals that humans won’t relate to them in any further way than how they are relating to them today?

What other options are there?

Animal = instinctual? Human = reasoning? Attributed identities in a human-centered narrative

If we don’t accept the view that nonhuman animals are those who have to stand below humans, within a frame given by e.g. a biological, philosophical or even divine hierarchy-of-being, then such a claim doesn’t have to be solely morally motivated. It can also mean that we question the way in which both identities („animal“ and „human“) are understood, that we question the separation and qualifications of these identities, even before the questions of our wrongdoings enter the floor of debate.

We can ask if the interpretation of the characteristics that are considered to make up the marking dividers within a human-animal hierarchy, are in reality a negation of the autonomous value of otherness in nonhuman animals.

We know that the single criterion that serves as our standard, is the human parameter, i.e. the human model counts as the ideal, as the standard, for creating norms.

So what happens if we put this standard of measurement into doubt?

It’s a question of perspective!

Conclusions deduced in the fields of biology and psychology, with those being the main academic sectors that deal with the explicability of animal identity, nail the perspectives:

  1. on relevant characteristics
  2. on how animal characteristics (in either, the case of humans or nonhuman animals) have to a.) express themselves and b.) in which exact correlation they have to become „measurable“, in order to reach a certain relevance or meaningfulness from a human point of perspective.

So the problem lies in the question why humans won’t accept nonhuman animal autonomy when it can’t be made fathomable through the perception of a value-defined comparison.

Why are own animal criterions and why is their independent meaningfulness (for the sake of themselves and for their situation within their natural and social inter- and co-specific contexts) rendered irrelevant, when they cross our perspectivical glance, and when these animal criteria could also be understood and accepted to fully lay outside of our hierarchical-framework?

Animal individuality

To be willing to accept an autonomous meaningfulness of nonhuman animals, means to question the deindividualization, that our views and explanations about nonhuman animals purport.

Those are the views that allow us to set nonhuman animals in comparison to us, as ‘the human group’ of identity, instead of seeing otherness in itself as a full value. And those are also the views that seek to sort out how the existential ‘meaning’ of nonhuman animals might relate to anything that matters to us “humans” as a closed group of identity.

The deindividualized view of nonhuman animals almost automatically goes along with the subtraction of value in terms of attributed meaningfulness, and so we land at the moral question now, as the question of identities, individual existence and deinidivdualisation pose some ethical conflicts.

Nonhuman animals, and the attributed identities in the fields of “animal” and “human” social contexts

If we can view nonhuman animals, apart from their localization in the realm of biology, for example also in a sociological context, then we could ask the question: „How do people act towards nonhumans animals?“

Can we explain the behaviour of humans towards nonhuman animals solely by referring to the common notion that one can’t really behave in any particular way towards nonhuman animals because they are supposedly ‘instinctively set’ and ‘communicatively restricted’ compared to us, and that thus our behaviour towards them can’t contain an own quality of a social dynamic?

Can we legitimate our typically human social misbehaviour towards nonhuman animals by referring to the „stupidity“ that we interpret into nonhuman animal behaviour?

(Such questions would of course only feed themselves on stereotypes of animal identity, no matter from where they stem.)

However we probably can’t ask any of such questions a sociologist, though it could fall into their scope to analyse these relationships. Sociologists likely would prefer to deal with the Animal Rights movement and not deal with the interaction between humans and nonhuman animals, since everyone seems to be with the fact that a natural science, biology, has already determined what the identity of nonhuman animals “factually” is. And it must be said that even the Animal Rights movement seems the place moral question somewhere almost out of reach by accepting the explanation of the identity of animals as something more or less strictly biological.

***

A geometrical image

Imagine two abstract groups. Group A consists of triangles and everything that surrounds them becomes mathematically relevant to their own triangular form. This happens as all that either resembles or does not resemble a triangle appears in a certain colour.

Group B are circles.

Now group A says that group B aren’t triangles (because A are triangles) and that B also weren’t squares or rectangles.

Does any reason follow from this that would mathematically legitimate for the circles to be excluded as equally valid geometrical figures?

The triangles are different compared to the circles, but both are geometrical figures and insofar of an equal value.

They can be correlated due to each of their geometrical qualities, even when the circles do not match the characteristics of the triangles!

Let’s take this as our metaphor

Sociology does not question the social interaction between humans and nonhuman animals. They don’t scrutinize that relation from their viewpoint, because the view held on the human relation towards animals is already set in its core by the natural sciences.

The hierarchical empire built by the natural sciences though [and along with it the humanistic knowledge on which the natural sciences base upon] rules every need for any further examination and consideration of this relationship out. We do not see the direct relation between humans and nonhuman animals.

A most typical exemplification of that inability to relate on a basic and fundamental level of ‘common sense’ can be pinpointed in the difference between relating to nonhuman animals in terms of “joy” versus “love”: as in “animals equally feel joy” or “we can both love”, and “pain” versus “violence”: as in: “animals can equally feel pain” or “we can both experience violence”. Love is a intermittent sentiment, violence also basis on social interactivity (though in that negative sense), where as “joy” is located only in the subject we attribute the feeling to, and the same goes for “pain”.

We – nonhuman animals and humans – understand the questions of LOVE and VIOLENCE. Whereby “joy” and “pain” are reductionary names for the “same” thing.

Regarding the question whether animals can be regarded in any way as moral agents, one has to ask, does moral exist outside the human concept of morality?

When we discuss morality we presume that the substance matter which the term comprises came into life through our perceptions, and because we define what „moral“ means, we can claim a described phenomenon as solely ours.

What does morality consist of?

Does morality solely exist because of a theoretical framework? One can doubt that. Morality on the one side has something to do with basic social interaction, through that morality gains value.

On the other side are the superordinate agreements about morality, which are declared and decided upon by an elite or defining group/process, but through that the agreements about morality only contain a forced validity, which is disconnected from its own basis, that is: the meaning of social interaction between beings (i.e. the construct about morality excludes that what lays outside of its hierarchy, other forms of interaction that contain „social values“ ).

On the individual plane exists that what any “I” perceives and experiences in her lived interactions and experiences as „morally okay“. And that can be between nonhuman animals or humans in the whole environmental context – seen from a common sense point of view if we take the human view.

When we discard the human decorum that surrounds and sticks to the word morality, we can say that every action has a moral implication, non-anthropocentrically seen.

It’s always the same: otherness. We have to accept it.

Animals have a very different philosophy-of-living in a neutral comparison to our philosophy of life, and I believe one can use the term philosophy here to describe the yet unnamed phenomenon in nonhumans animals of how they structure and perceive their own lives.

I ask myself whether the human problem with nonhuman animals isn’t rather to be found in the differences of their philosophies-of-life when compared to our typically human ones.

The problems lie much more in this radical otherness from us, than in the reasons of gradual biological differences or in the often assumed moral impotence on this other one’s (the animal’s) behalf.

The problem thus seems to fluctuate around the scope of difference and coinciding similarity. In many aspects we equal nonhumans animals a lot, but in the aspect of our dominance claim finally, we see nonhuman animals as „the losers“, the bottom of the evolutionary or divinely ordained hierarchical order on which we can postulate our violent and hypocritical sense of power.

That nonhuman animals are the losers amongst the biological animals is even an attitude that some of their advocates purport. I often meet people who won’t reckon a unique, self-sufficient quality seen to be in the closeness and distance amongst the different animals (including human animals). In the forefront of every argumentation there is always: how are they in comparison to us. As if humans and nonhuman animals had to compete on an „equal” scale … and another related argumentation goes: how much of their „instinct“ could possibly entitle them to be granted rights; right that would protect them from humans (whereby it is highly questionable whether those who have prejudices against you, can really grant you your own rights.)

Human society, it seems, will always consider the „us“ and the „we“ as objectively more important, insofar as the „we“, the how „we are“, is the criterion, and nonhumans animals are measured against it.

The crucial point is to accept others and to accept the validity of otherness. For the others and maybe even for us!

Reaching far? Animal Thealogy – female animal deities, female human deities, on the terms of such angles.

Painting: Io by intersectional antispeciesist veg*AR artist Farangis G. Yegane – Lebensschutz!

 

Animal Thealogy: Man-Machine? Animal Reason! (Part 2)


Io – Farangis G Yegane

Animal Thealogy:

Man-Machine? Animal Reason! (2)

(And this was part one of that text.)

Palang LY

A geometrical image

Imagine two abstract groups. Group A consists of triangles and everything that surrounds them becomes mathematically relevant to their own triangular form. This happens as all that either resembles or does not resemble a triangle appears in a certain colour.

Group B are circles.

Now group A says that group B aren’t triangles (because A are triangles) and that B also weren’t squares or rectangles.

Does any reason follow from this that would mathematically legitimate for the circles to be excluded as equally valid geometrical figures?

The triangles are different compared to the circles, but both are geometrical figures and insofar of an equal value.

They can be correlated due to each of their geometrical qualities, even when the circles do not match the characteristics of the triangles!

Let’s take this as our metaphor

Sociology does not question the social interaction between humans and nonhuman animals. They don’t scrutinize that relation from their viewpoint, because the view held on the human relation towards animals is already set in its core by the natural sciences.

The hierarchical empire built by the natural sciences though [and along with it the humanistic knowledge on which the natural sciences base upon] rules every need for any further examination and consideration of this relationship out. We do not see the direct relation between humans and nonhuman animals.

A most typical exemplification of that inability to relate on a basic and fundamental level of ‘common sense’ can be pinpointed in the difference between relating to nonhuman animals in terms of “joy” versus “love”: as in “animals equally feel joy” or “we can both love”, and “pain” versus “violence”: as in: “animals can equally feel pain” or “we can both experience violence”. Love is a intermittent sentiment, violence also basis on social interactivity (though in that negative sense), where as “joy” is located only in the subject we attribute the feeling to, and the same goes for “pain”.

We – nonhuman animals and humans – understand the questions of LOVE and VIOLENCE. Whereby “joy” and “pain” are reductionary names for the “same” thing.

Regarding the question whether animals can be regarded in any way as moral agents, one has to ask, does moral exist outside the human concept of morality?

When we discuss morality we presume that the substance matter which the term comprises came into life through our perceptions, and because we define what „moral“ means, we can claim a described phenomenon as solely ours.

What does morality consist of?

Does morality solely exist because of a theoretical framework? One can doubt that. Morality on the one side has something to do with basic social interaction, through that morality gains value.

On the other side are the superordinate agreements about morality, which are declared and decided upon by an elite or defining group/process, but through that the agreements about morality only contain a forced validity, which is disconnected from its own basis, that is: the meaning of social interaction between beings (i.e. the construct about morality excludes that what lays outside of its hierarchy, other forms of interaction that contain „social values“ ).

On the individual plane exists that what any “I” perceives and experiences in her lived interactions and experiences as „morally okay“. And that can be between nonhuman animals or humans in the whole environmental context – seen from a common sense point of view if we take the human view.

When we discard the human decorum that surrounds and sticks to the word morality, we can say that every action has a moral implication, non-anthropocentrically seen.

It’s always the same: otherness. We have to accept it.

Animals have a very different philosophy-of-living in a neutral comparison to our philosophy of life, and I believe one can use the term philosophy here to describe the yet unnamed phenomenon in nonhumans animals of how they structure and perceive their own lives.

I ask myself whether the human problem with nonhuman animals isn’t rather to be found in the differences of their philosophies-of-life when compared to our typically human ones.

The problems lie much more in this radical otherness from us, than in the reasons of gradual biological differences or in the often assumed moral impotence on this other one’s (the animal’s) behalf.

The problem thus seems to fluctuate around the scope of difference and coinciding similarity. In many aspects we equal nonhumans animals a lot, but in the aspect of our dominance claim finally, we see nonhuman animals as „the losers“, the bottom of the evolutionary or divinely ordained hierarchical order on which we can postulate our violent and hypocritical sense of power.

That nonhuman animals are the losers amongst the biological animals is even an attitude that some of their advocates purport. I often meet people who won’t reckon a unique, self-sufficient quality seen to be in the closeness and distance amongst the different animals (including human animals). In the forefront of every argumentation there is always: how are they in comparison to us. As if humans and nonhuman animals had to compete on an „equal” scale … and another related argumentation goes: how much of their „instinct“ could possibly entitle them to be granted rights; right that would protect them from humans (whereby it is highly questionable whether those who have prejudices against you, can really grant you your own rights.)

Human society, it seems, will always consider the „us“ and the „we“ as objectively more important, insofar as the „we“, the how „we are“, is the criterion, and nonhumans animals are measured against it.

The crucial point is to accept others and to accept the validity of otherness. For the others and maybe even for us!

Reaching far? Animal Thealogy – female animal deities, female human deities, on the terms of such angles.

 

Standing Point. Intersectional vegan hardcore from Piracicaba, São Paulo, Brazil!

Standing Point. Intersectional vegan hardcore from Piracicaba, São Paulo, Brazil!

Standing Points voice Alex Peguinelli tells us on the intersectionality of ethical veganism:

Well, we are a third world band, so we see veganism and animal rights in a particular way. We have so many problems here in America Latina, that people don’t even think about the non-human animals, so being a vegan, straight edge and anarchist band here is very necessary.

Beyond the band we are involved with vegan anti-consumerist collectives and the struggle for public transport. We think that talking about veganism is talking about anti-consumerist politics, anti-capitalist issues and a lot of other things that are directly connected with the human and non-human animal liberation.

Our Album ‘Work. Consume. Die.’ talks about the inability to live a free life in a world that offers you only prisons.

Standing Point – Loveless

“People who talk about revolution and class struggle without referring explicitly to everyday life, without understanding what is subversive about love and hate, live and DIE, and what is to refuse their limitations, these people speak with a corpse between their teeth.”

Loveless

I threw myself from the highest cliffs
from the most beautiful mountains
I threw myself from the largest buildings

Always knowing that the ground
would be the (final) destination
That the fall would be the path

And the wind would lead life
like carrying pieces of paper

What can we do with the crumbs of theories?

(Normality can properly
Teach people how to live
And how to die)

What can we do with the crumbs of theories?

I tried to hold the air
I tried to hold in the air
I tried to leave the flight
a rough landing
inevitable and painful

And then life became
a scenographic city
if you pull to strong
the walls fall down

Now I see through
these falling walls
That love is the only reason of life
Love for struggle
Love for resistence
Love for freedom

No Compromise
No Excuses

Freedom
By any means necessary

(We turn again to the streets
But we have changed
And the streets mean something different now
We walked and these moments changed us
We saw buildings burning
We were touched by death
We loved and we felt alive
We saw the moon rising behind the barricades
We heard the echo of our voice in the voices of others

We do not walk today
asking the power for grant
They had never legislated peace or freedom
Now their armies cannot occupy our dreams
And their prisons cannot contain our number

This is our world
And these streets belong to us

We are the other,
We are the unemployed,
We are the hungry,
We are the homeless,
We are the thieves,
We are the saboteurs,
We are taking the streets,
We are destroying corporations,
We are taking control of the factories,
We are walking through the night carrying a heart on fire.

all of us,
we are everyone,
we are one.)

Standing Point – The Real Change

Connect through

Bandcamp: http://standingpoint.bandcamp.com
FB: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Standing-Point/240527789340168

We asked the vegan hardcore band Eat Me Fresh about veganism and intersectionality

We asked the vegan hardcore band Eat Me Fresh about veganism and intersectionality:

Just like we do think there is no place for racism in hardcore and in the world as it is, so we think there is no place for speciesism.

Being a vegan doesn’t mean that we just don’t eat meat and dairy products, it means a lot more like that we care about the planet we live on, and that we don’t want to waste it.

And the thing is, that people think that they are so clever, and they just don’t mind that we weren’t the first on this planet. We are as ”immigrants” as every species is, but every species became a member on this planet, in another time or on another place.

We don’t own the planet, the planet owns us. And as we behave to it, it will behave to us.

Sexism, Racism, Speciesism, Nationalism and much more of these evil things should be over.

THIS IS THE 21st CENTURY. PLEASE PEOPLE WAKE UP!

STAY FRESH.

https://www.facebook.com/eatmefresh

Eat Me Fresh, themselves being from the Czech Republic, have been touring Europe this year. They released their track INSIDE OF US this August 2013 on Bandcamp http://eatmefresh.bandcamp.com/.

Das Geheimnis der Liebe zum Leben. Religiöse Widerständler und heidnische Modernisten.

Das Geheimnis der Liebe zum Leben

Religiöse Widerständler und heidnische Modernisten

Von Thorm KePa

Dieser Text als PDF (Link öffnet sich in einem neuen Fenster)

Die Katharer waren eine christliche Splittergruppe des europäischen Hochmittelalters, die ihren Glauben an den Gut-Böse-Dualismus der aus Persien stammenden Manichäer des 3. Jahrunderts nach Christus anlehnte. Die Manichäer selbst verbanden unterschiedliche Elemente in ihrem Glauben und so findet man bei ihnen auch eine Anlehnung an das Christentum.

Beide Glaubensgruppen teilten die Vorstellung, dass Tiere nicht geopfert werden dürfen – weder für religöse Zwecke, noch zu Ernährungszwecken. Man geht allerdings davon aus, dass die Katharer Fische aus dieser Vorstellung des (gewollten oder indirekten, religiös verordenten) Lebensschutzes ausschlossen, weil sie meinten, dass sich Fische nicht geschlechtlich vermehren würden und aus dem Wasser entstünden.

Die Katharer glaubten, dass „Lichtteile“ von Engelsseelen ausversehen mit einem toten Tier mitverzehrt werden könnten, und die Manichäer meinten, dass Tiere-Essen hätte zur Folge, dass die „Lichtteile“ des Tieres durch den Verzehr nicht aus dem Tierkörper entweichen könnten. Beide Glaubensgruppen erwarteten eine strenge Befolgung ihrer asketischen Ideale aber nur von der Priesterschaft (bei den Katharern die Parfaits, bei den Manichäern die Electi).

Es gab eine Reihe von Schnittstellen beider Glaubenssysteme, eine davon scheint uns in die Gegenwart zu führen: die Hütung des Geheimnisses irdischer Existenz. Ein Stein bei den Manichäern, ein Gral bei den Katharern.

„Wolfram’s Grail/Stone bears a great resemblance to the Manichaean jewel, the Buddhist padma mani, the jewel found in the heart of the lotus that is the solar symbol of the Great Liberation and which can also be found in the Indian traditions concerning the Tree of Life.” Jean Markale, The Grail: The Celtic Origins of the Sacred Icon, 1999, S. 134.

Beim christlichen Ritter Wolfram von Eschenbach in seinem Parzival taucht der „heilige Gral“, der in der Mystik des Mittelalters für so viele Ritterorden von solch großer Bedeutung war, in der Form des „lapsit excillis / Lapis excilis“ auf:

„Die wehrliche Ritterschaft,
höret, was ihr Nahrung schafft:
Sie leben von einem Stein,
dessen Art muss edel sein.
Ist euch der noch unbekannt,
Sein Name wird euch hier genannt:
Er heißet Lapis exilis.
Von seiner Kraft der Phönix
Verbrennt, dass er zu Asche wird
Und dann der Gluth verjüngt entschwirrt.
Der Phönix schüttelt sein Gefieder
Und gewinnt so lichten Schimmer wieder,
Das er schöner wird als eh.
Wär einem Menschen noch so weh,
Doch stirbt er nich denselben Tag,
Da er den Stein erschauen mag,
Und noch die nächste Woche nicht;
Auch enthellt sich nicht sein Angesicht:
Die Farbe bleibt ihm klar und rein,
Wenn er täglich schaut den Stein,
Wie in seiner besten Zeit
Einst als Jüngling oder Maid.
Säh er den Stein zweihundert Jahr,
Ergrauen würd ihm nicht sein Haar.
Solche Kraft dem Menschen gibt der Stein,
Daß ihm Fleisch und Gebein
Wieder jung wird gleich zur Hand:
Dieser Stein ist Gral genannt.“

Parzival und Titurel: Rittergedichte von Wolfram von Eschenbach, Hrsg. Karl Simrock, Tübingen, 1842, S. 40-41.

Parzival and Titurel. By Wolfram von Eschenbach.

Siehe auch:

Wolfram von Eschenbach: Parzival. Mittelhochdeutscher Text. Hrsg. Karl Lachmann 1833, Berlin

Die Sicht auf den heiligen Gral eröffnet ein Spektrum in dem Inhalte mythischer und religiöser Natur gemeinsam im Universalen zu entdecken sind. Anerkannte „Religionen“ und heidnische „Mythen“ und „Legenden“ lassen sich nicht hundertprozentig voneinander trennen.

Eine andere Parallele, die diese beiden Brückenreligionen, die der Manichäer und die der Katharer, aufwiesen, war ihr Widerstandsgeist der sich gehen die Hauptkirche richtete, der sie sich jeweils entlehnten und durch die sie letzendlich auch vernichtet wurden. Die Manichäer wurden in ihrem Urspungsland Persien vom Zoroastrismus bekämpft, Mani in den Kerker gesteckt, wo er bald starb. Ein Zeungis der zoroastrischen Verachtung des Manichäismus finden wir in diesem Beispiel:

Studia Manichaica edited by Ronald E. Emmerick, Werner Sundermann, Peter Zieme

Die Katharer wurden im qualvoll lang andauernden Albigenserkreuzzug durch die Katholiken final ausgelöscht, nachdem auch die letzten friedlichen Verhandlungen zwischen ihnen und den Katholiken gescheitert waren. Der katharischen Priesterin Esclarmonde de Foix wurde bei diesen Verhandlungen vom später heiligen Dominikus der Mund verboten, sie sei eine Frau, daher stehe es ihr nicht zu sich in einen theologischen Disput einzumischen.

(Vergleiche: Gottfried Koch, Frauenfrage und Ketzertum im Mittelalter: die Frauenbewegung im Rahmen des Katharismus und des Waldensertums und ihre sozialen Wurzeln [12.-14. Jahrhundert], 1962, S. 52 und Giovanni Chiantore, Studi medievali, 1964, S. 748)

Auf dieser Seite befindet sich eine praktische Übersicht über den Verlauf des Albigenserkreuzzugs: http://www.okzitanien.de/historie.htm

Warum sich ausgerechtnet ein christlicher Ritter aus Franken, nämlich Wolfram von Eschenbach, mit einem Geheimnis befasste, dass auch diese beiden Widerstandsreligionen beschäftige, muss mit der geheimnisvollen Popularität des Mythos um den heiligen Gral gelegen haben, der in Europa besonders durch die Arthus-Legende bekannt gewesen ist.

Die Suche und zugleich die Festlegung dessen, worum es eigentlich in dieser Suche nach dem Gral geht (was nun das Abendland und das Mittelalter anbetrifft), ist bis in die deutsche Romantik hineingetragen worden, bedeutungsvoll und mit tiefem Pathos. So band Richard Wagner in seinem Parsifal neue Ideale an die Legende, die bis heute Fragen aufwirft, die für immer unbeantwortbar bleiben müssen.

Richard Wagner, der seinen Parsifal an den Eschenbachs anlehnte, befasste sich zu der Zeit als er dieses, sein letztes Werk schrieb, mit der buddhistischen Lehre der Gewaltsoligkeit gegenüber dem Leben und war fasziniert von der Möglichkeit der „Erlösung“ durch die menschliche Anerkennung der Verantwortung gegenüber dem Leid der Tiere. Er lag damit ganz im Geiste der europäischen vegetarischen Bewegung seiner Zeit.

Auf der Seite der International Vegetarian Union findet man zahlreiche detailierte Biographien von Menschen, die in der vegetarischen Bewegung damals eine Rolle spielten: http://www.ivu.org/

Wagner, der es selbst nicht ganz konsequent bis zum praktiziernden Vegetarier schaffte, schrieb über seine Gefühle der Gewalt Tieren gegenüber:

Richard Wagner an Mathilde Wesendonk (Timokrates Verlag), S. 53

Seine oft zitierte Ablehnung des „Urfalls“ der Gewalt gegenüber Tieren – der biblischen Geschichte über Kain, den Ackerbauenden, der aus Neid seinen Bruder Abel, den Hirten, erschlug, als Gott das Fleischopfer der pflanzlichen Opfergabe vorzog – erinnert intuitiv an die Ablehnung des Alten Testament der Katharer und der Manichäer.

Der Kritik an der jüdischen Tradition seitens Wagners mag damit zusammenhängen. Man will ein Übel an einem vermeintlichen Schuldigen festmachen, an einer bestimmten Lehre, damit man „der Sache“ habhaft werden kann – dabei ist jedes Übel immer an die Fehlerhaftigkeit individueller Menschen gebunden. Wagner wird sich kaum über die Tragweite seiner Kritik bewusst gewesen sein.

Aus Cosima Wagners Aufzeichnungen lässt sich einiges Wichtiges ableiten über das, was ihn zuletzt am meisten beschäftigt haben muss:

Jost Hermand, Freundschaft: Zur Geschichte einer sozialen Bindung , 2006, S. 100.

Wichtig ist es festzuhalten, dass die Suche nach dem heiligen Wahrheitskern auf diesem Pfad, wenn wir ihn denn so verfolgen, so scheint, dass der Lebensschutz bewusst, direkt und unbewusst und indirekt darin zu finden ist. Im Libretto Wagners erfahren wir, dass seine Gestalten im Parsifal von der Heiligkeit des Lebens sprechen:

KUNDRY: Sind die Tiere hier nicht heilig?

[…]

(Vom See her vernimmt man Geschrei und das Rufen der Ritter und Knappen.)

RITTER UND KNAPPEN: Weh’! – Weh’! Hoho! Auf! Wer ist der Frevler?

(Gurnemanz und die vier Knappen fahren auf und wenden sich erschrocken um. – Ein wilder Schwan flattert matten Fluges vom See daher; er ist verwundet, die Knappen und Ritter folgen ihm nach auf die Szene. Der Schwan sinkt, nach mühsamem Fluge, inatt zu Boden; der zweite Ritter zieht ihm den Pfeil aus der Brust. – Währenddem)

GURNEMANZ: Was gibt’s?

VIERTER KNAPPE: Dort!

DRITTER KNAPPE: Hier!

ZWEITER KNAPPE: Ein Schwan!

VIERTER KNAPPE: Ein Wilder Schwan!

DRITTER KNAPPE: Er ist verwundet!

ALLE RITTER UND KNAPPEN: Ha! Wehe! Wehe!

GURNEMANZ: Wer schoss den Schwan?

DER ERSTE RITTER (hervorkommend): Der König grüsste ihn als gutes Zeichen, als überm See kreiste der Schwan, da flog ein Pfeil…

KNAPPEN UND RITTER (Parsifal hereinführend, auf Parsifals Bogen weisend): Der war’s! Der schoss! Dies der Bogen! Hier der Pfeil, den seinen gleich.

GURNEMANZ (zu Parsifal): Bist du’s, der diesen Schwan erlegte?

PARSIFAL: Gewiss! Im Fluge treff’ ich, was fliegt!

GURNEMANZ: Du tatest das? Und bangt’ es dich nicht vor der Tat?

DIE KNAPPEN UND RITTER: Strafe dem Frevler!

GURNEMANZ : Unerhörtes Werk! Du konntest morden, – hier im heil’gen Walde, des’ Stiller Friede dich umfing? Des Haines Tiere nahten dir nicht zahm, – Grüssten dich freundlich und fromm? Aus den Zweigen, was sangen die Vöglein dir? Was tat dir der treue Schwan? Sein Weibchen zu suchen, flog er auf, mit ihm zu kreisen über dem See, den so er herrlich weihte zum Bad. – Dem stauntest du nicht? Dich lockt’ es nur zu wild kindischem Bogengeschoss?

Er war uns hold: was ist er nun dir? Hier, schau her! – hier trafst du ihn: da starrt noch das Blut, – matt hängen die Fluegel; das Schneegefieder dunkel befleckt, – gebrochen das Aug’, – siehst du den Blick? (Parsifal hat Gurnemanz mit wachsender Ergriffenheit zugehört; jetzt zerbricht er seinen Bogen und schleudert die Pfeile von sich.) Wirst deiner Sündentat du inne? (Parsifal führt die Hand über die Augen.) Sag’, Knab’, erkennst du deine grosse Schuld? Wie konntest du sie begehn?

PARSIFAL: Ich wusste sie nicht.

So fast auch der Kulturgeschichtler Jost Hermand diesbezüglich zusammen:

 

Jost Hermand, Glanz und Elend der deutschen Oper, 2008, S. 139.

Es wird einen Grund haben, warum die Katharer und die Manichäer bis heute dafür bekannt sind, dass sie es als eine Vollendung ihrer Glaubensmission betrachteten in der Askese zu leben, die Gewalt gegen Tiere vermeidet. Und es wird einen Grund haben, warum wir das Motif des Lebensschutzes in anderer Form, aber gebunden an den Mythos der Gralslehre, wieder finden in der deutschen Romantik.

Der Wert solcher Botschaften ist ein fragiler. Der sensible Sinn entweicht schnell denen, die zweifeln an der Möglichkeit des Menschen als transspezies-empathisches Wesen. Aber gerade an dieser Zerbrechlichkeit mag das Geheimnis einer Erkenntnissuche liegen – an dem zu halten, was kaum zu greifen ist, was aber tief in das Herz führt. Weder Religion noch wahre Kunst ist ohne Sensibilität und Reverenz für das Leben denkbar und wenn sie diese nicht aufweisen, werden sie zu Zerstörern.

Es geht hier nicht darum, ob ein Mensch, der durch sein Talent und sein Schaffen besonders hervorragt, nun mit gutem Beispiel voranging und wie genau. Wagner schaffte es selbst nicht ganz hin zum zumindest dauerhaft gelebten Vegetarismus, aber er bemühte sich um eine Botschaft des All-Lebensschutzes, die die Forderung beinhaltete, dass Tiere nicht gejagt, gegessen, getötet werden dürften. Worum es geht ist, dass die Erinnerung und das Bewusstsein über Zeit und Geschichte hinweg erhalten bleiben. Das besondere ist, von welchen Seiten her Fragen aufgeworfen wurden am menschlicher Töten von Tieren für den Fleischverzehr und für das Opfern, gleichwohl wir Zeugnisse dieser Art in den Irrgärten menschlicher Überlieferung nur wie Fragmente zusammentragen können.

So existierte der Manichäismus beispielsweise in einer Zeit, in der er als ‚Lichtreligion’ schon durch eine innere menschliche Spaltung zwischen einem absolut Guten und einem absolut Bösen belastet war. Hier konnte man die Sinnlosigkeit und die ethische Verwerflichkeit der Verursachung von Leid durch den Menschen als eine eigene Verantwortlichkeit, der im menschlichen Handeln Rechnung getragen werden muss, nicht mehr ohne Weiteres thematisieren, denn sowohl die Macht des Bösen, als auch die des Guten waren so gewaltig, dass das eigene Handeln nicht mehr als ein dienen oder gehorchen (der einen oder der anderen Seite) sein konnte.

Dort wo Mensch und Tier in ihrer Problematik und in ihrer Heiligkeit ihres Lebens als Eins genommen werden, wird es für uns aber immer schwierig bleiben das anhand der weltanschaulichen Hinterlassenschaften solcher kulturellen Begebenheiten nachweisen zu können. Zum einen wird man hier keine direkte Hervorhebung der Tierproblematik finden, zum anderen, gehen wir zu stark davon aus, dass alle menschlichen Lebensvorstellungen im Bezug auf die Mitwelt eigentlich ähnlich gewesen sein müssten wie unserer heute.

St. Augustinus , der erst begeistert vom Manichäismus war, wendete sich später von ihm ab in Empörung und überlieferte uns in seiner Kritik viel über die Gründe, warum die Manichäer Tiere nicht töten, opfern oder essen wollten: http://books.google.de/books?id=lHZPAAAAYAAJ&redir_esc=y, + http://www.animalrightshistory.org/animal-rights-antiquity-ce/mani/mani.htm)

Im persischen Mythos gibt es den Humaay / Homa, den Phönix, der im Schahnameh und im iranischen Schöpfungsmythos auch Simorgh genannt wird, in prominenter Weise. Dieser mythische Vogel trug im gesamten Kulturraum zahlreiche, fast unzählige Nahmen, denn er stand für ein Seins-Prinzip.

Abbildung, Miniatur eines unbekannten Künstlers aus dem Schahnameh von Firdausi: Simorgh trägt das Kind Zal zu seinem Nest um es vor dem Tode zu retten.

Die bekanntesten Erzählungen über diese Vogelgestalt ist die von Farīd ad-Dīn ʻAṭṭār: The Conference of the Birds und die des im Gebirge nistenden Vogels Simorgh, der das ausgestzte Kind Zal rettet und aufzieht, im Schahnameh von Firdausi.

Nach der Vorstellung im iranischen Mythos teilte sich das Sein in drei Bereiche auf:

1. Die verletzliche Leiblichkeit auf dieser Erde, die „Tankard“; der Raum der Sichtbarkeit und Greifbarkeit.

2. Gab es den Bereich des Sichtbaren aber Ungreifbaren, der durch Simorgh dargestellt wurde. Simorgh konnte nur auf der Erde verletzt werden, aber auch niemals ‚getötet’ werden, sie war der Vogel der Wiedererstehung. Sobald sie vom Boden abhob, konnte man sie auch nicht mehr verletzen.

3. Und es gab den Bereich des Unsichtbaren und Ungreifbaren, den Bereich der Gottheit Vohuman, in der das Sein überging, wenn es auf der Erde verletzt wird und sich nicht mehr schützen kann.

Diese drei Bereiche waren untrennbar Verbunden. In dem Buch: Das Denken beginnt mit dem Lachen: die unsterbliche Kultur der Iran von M. Jamali und G. Y. Arani-May wird der Mythos des Simorgh in seinem Kontext erörtert. Das Buch ist hier abrufbar.

 

Veganic plus Animal Sanctuaries plus Ethics

Palang LY

Veganic plus Animal Sanctuaries plus Ethics

There so far is no such thing as a “positive” veganic (which means: organic vegan agriculture) Animal Rights consciousness.

Not taking into consideration that nonhuman animals must be helped by all possible means, here looks to me like a form of speciesism might be lurking in the background, since if humans where in a comparable plight, anybody who would describe him-/herself as a non- misanthrope would help the humans in question.

What I am mainly interested in is:

Why doesn’t it occur to vegans and the veganic (vegan organic) movement, that humans and nonhuman animals can co-exist, can co-live without exploitation, as an option?

I have looked at various veganic projects, and as far as one can see, “animal rights” only plays a role in the way, that exploitation and usage of animals and animal products / fertilizer derived from animals is non-permitted, on ethical grounds, mainly. Hence, these people are VEGANS, and not just any people avoiding animal products: They avoid animal exploitation. That’s the Animal Rights part of the veganic movement.

But apart from that, the very nonhuman animals that we as VEGANS want to HELP, don’t come in or become visible or noticed as beings that we are willing to live together with, that we are willing to share the earth with. As if the soil and the forests were ours to use, ours to live on, ours to say what’s right to do with it (“it” … that is: nature).

Billions of animals

Of course the forceful exploitation of the reproductive system of animals has to stop. Of course any form of overpopulation is bad for anybody and this planet. But the lives, that didn’t chose to come into this world, the lives that just happen to find themselves here – we do have to ethically respect the fact that these individuals exist.

Sanctuaries and vegan farming should merge I believe! To cut a long “story” short and practical.

But back to veganic-ism as it is

There is the mention of using human manure and faeces for fertilization (apart from the much more promising sounding self-fertilizing gardening methods which exist in veganicism too of course). But if people are willing to use their own manure, as part of the biological process of vegan agriculture, can’t the idea of “the sanctuary” and the idea of a newly veganic option be created in peoples minds? People can tolerate their own manure somewhere, but not another (nonhuman) animal’s manure? I think we cannot say that it is speciesist and exploitative if both humans and nonhuman animals live together in a natural space without harming or exploiting or using each other.

We as vegans ought to LIVE together with the other animals on this planet, in a peaceful manner, in mixed communities. If we can’t develop a consciousness for that, we fail at creating a (more complete) positive ethic. It’s enormously tragic that we let the speciesist view of “animals, us and the world” win insofar, that this view manages to inspire us vegans not to willingly plan to live together with the so called farm animals in a vegan, caring manner, with a strong will to co-exist.

Are the only options we can chose from the one of degrading nonhuman animals or otherwise totally excluding them, and making them nonexistent in a (desired utopian) daily reality? No, really, because this planet is also an animals’ planet!

Ethics … To me the veganic movement makes itself look as if it creates and expresses a bifurcation in what veganism ideally should mean. As good at it looks now and as much as such farming practices are heading for the major part in a promising and important and ethically inevitable direction, the veganic code of ethics nevertheless ignores an important factor and that is, again, to include all animals in a life affirming way.

This fallacy in the veganic vegan understanding makes vegans overall look as if this movement was basically about clearing nonhuman animals in their positives – and as living facts and individual fates – simply out of our lives!

I think there is morally something going drastically wrong with us.

This text as a PDF (link opens in a new window)

Würden Sie wegen Ihres Veganismus auch auf Gott und Glauben verzichten?

Palang LY

„Macht Euch die Erde untertan“ 1. Mose (1)

Würden Sie wegen Ihres Veganismus auch auf Gott und Glauben verzichten?

Wenn wir Tiere nicht als Produkte, als Ware betrachten, als Besitz mit dem man machen kann was man will, wieso sind wir dann bereit hinzunehmen, dass Tiere auf dem Altar der Religionen oder traditioneller Bräuche geopfert werden? Wir schließen Zirkusse und Pelz aus, obgleich auch sie Bestandteile unserer spezisistischen „Kulturen“ sind. Aber wenn es um den Glauben geht, dann ist uns unser Gott wichtiger als das Recht, das wir nichtmenschlichen Tiere zuteil werden lassen müssten, um als Menschen wirklich gerecht/er zu werden.

Sollten wir nicht von vegan lebenden Menschen erwarten können, dass sie wissen, dass ein Tier nicht nur im Bezug auf Kommerz und Großindustrie verdinglicht und objektifiziert werden darf?

Manche sprechen vom Respekt gegenüber Tieren, der ausreiche um der Tierrechtsfrage gerecht zu werden. Und sie sagen es sei akzeptabel Tiere aus religiösen (sprich aus „geheiligten“) Gründen zu töten, wenn man dem Tier nur ausreichend Respekt gegenüber brächte. Und man soll das Tier, das zum Opfer wird, „human“ Töten. Das ist kein veganer Standpunkt, denn der Veganimus fordert, dass kein Tier zum menschlichen Nutzen eingesetzt werden darf. Die Religion kann hier keine Sonderregelung schaffen, denn es geht im Veganimus um Tiere und nicht um Gott.

Es geht um Lebewesen und das Leben. Wenn ich ein Tier meinen Zwecken unterwerfe, um es zu benutzen, zu verletzen und zu töten, dann lässt sich das nicht mit einer veganen Ethik auf sinnvolle Weise verbinden, auch wenn eine Religion solches von mir fordern möchte.

Manche sagen, das möge schon stimmen, aber so schnell könnten wir mit einem Umdenken bei religiös denkenden Menschen nicht rechnen, wenn überhaupt. Wir seien mit der veganen Bewegung ja überhaupt erst am Anfang und Religion und auf ihnen fußende traditionelle Bräuche könne man nicht von heute auf morgen abschaffen.

Solch eine Denkrichtung ist nicht ganz richtig. Denn auch wenn Gesellschaften – die im Westen oder die in der östlichen Hemisphäre gelegene Gesellschaften – bislang weit entfernt davon sind sich in Richtung eines Bewusstseins zu bewegen, dass Tiere auf ethische und affirmative Weise mit einbeschließen würde, nichtsdestotrotz richten sich unsere Vorstellungen über die vegane Lebensweise nicht nach dem „wie es in diesem Moment ist“ oder dem „wie es in der Vergangenheit war“, sondern nach dem „wie es sein sollte“!

Eine Utopie hat es bis hierher geschafft, und eine Utopie kann es, wenn sie nur konsequent durchgeführt wird, auch noch weiter schaffen.

So gravierende Lücken, wie die Inkaufnahme des Tieropfers in Religionen – d. h. rituelle und traditionelle Bräuche unangetastet zu lassen – bergen, außer dem Unrecht das sie aus Tierrechtssicht darstellen, die Gefahr der Verwässerung in sich für die, die meinen dass beides ging: konsequenter Veganismus und das Festhalten an einem Glauben, der das Gehorsam über die Vernunft setzt.

Der Sinn des Veganismus als das bislang effizienteste Mittel um der Tierausbeutung mit Widerstand zu begegnen, erscheint im Kontext von Religiosität fragwürdig, wenn die Religion den Menschen sowieso an die obeste Stelle der Schöpfung setzt. Eine Ergänzug im ethischen Codex wäre dann nowendig, kann in einem religiösen Denksystem aber nicht wirklich vollzogen werden, weil hier ja nur Gott und die von ihm auserkorenen solche gravierenden Entscheidungen über Sein und nicht sein und den Wert des Seins fällen dürfen.

Tiere sind keine Gegenstände, weder zum profanen Handel, noch im “erhabenen” Geiste – weder als Konsumgut, noch für einen Gott dessen menschliche Schöpfung.

(1) „Und Gott segnete sie und sprach zu ihnen: Seid fruchtbar und mehrt euch und füllt die Erde und macht sie euch untertan und herrscht über die Fische im Meer und über die Vögel unter dem Himmel und über alles Getier, das auf Erden kriecht.“
http://bibel-online.net/buch/luther_1912/1_mose/1/ (letzter Zugriff vom 19. Nov. 2012)

Vegan Politics and Animal Politics

Vegan politics is animal politics

Veganism is a new enviro-social phenomenon taking place at the core of society. Today’s veganism is clearly predominantly defined by an ethical motivation. The wide spectrum of vegan ethics cover: the concern for nonhuman animals in the forefront, alongside the protection of the natural environment and the burden of inner human conflicts (pertaining to gender, ethnic diversity, human coexistence, the wider environmental consciousness). As little as the public wants to be aware of that, a multifocal approach plays a key role for an ethically motivated vegan to adapt her or his lifestyle.

Enlightenment efficiency

You can reach a wider audience to empower and educate with a notion of what can be called “vegan pedagogy” than you can with an ivory tower intra scholarly debate about the details of “what rights to preferably grant to which species given the circumstances under which that would be possible, if at all”.

Politics is applicability

The politics of animal rights and the vegan movement are to date inseparably connected. Vegan pedagogy entails an empowerment that lets the “recipient” know, that she or he can voice own constructive thoughts, and that she or he can and is actively participating in a democratic processes that encompasses the recognition and establishment of animal rights and animal politics (animal law) respectively.

Without an active encouragement of the individual person to participate in this democratic process and to use own creativity, we can’t expect for a consciousness of respecting other life forms to become a viable reality in a near future that’s already bound to inhabilitate people rather than to respect their democratic potentials other that voting.

Also we should seek to avoid “prescribing” knowledge that has been agreed upon exclusively by scholars, whose accepted canons eventually are taken over by authorities and the law, and then set as golden rules by which people in society will have to go.

Self-participation in critical thinking and questioning is the key word in “vegan pedagogy”, which in turn can become a key to create a perfect basis in terms of awareness for “animal politics”.

Animal Politics

Animal politics can be a political idea that encompasses nonhuman animals as how their lives and their paths-of-life become intelligible to the sensitized human being.

A theory for animal politics can only be drafted from experience. The closest experiences that people from the general populace have with the adversaries of society’s human-animal relationship – that make animal politics necessary – are ethically motivated vegans.

To separate the sociology of veganism from what will become the new intersection of animal rights politics, that overlays environmental rights and human right, would mean to dysfunction the most vital societal democratic impulse.

From individual to individual

Speciesism and homocentrism are the external manifestations of patterns in thinking that deny animal intelligence, and instead overvalue human intelligence. Humans are mostly behaving contractualist, unpredictable, unreliable, unfair, … and the list could go on in pretty negative terms. I wonder why that is the case, and I think it does not have to be that way.

I think it is possible for a human to be ‘animal intelligent’, to be non-contractualist, predictable, fair, tolerant, loving, … and that list could go on in positive terms. From my experiences with animals I learned about the possibility of ‘animal intelligence’:  The animals I have lived with truly were my best friends.

I think for a person who is truly nonspeciesistic in his/her thoughts and critical about homocentrism  it should be technically possible to really make the shift and start to become a better individual than what humans have per definition been so far, and even prided themselves with.

The time of human intelligence is over for me.

I am glad I defend animal rights from a standpoint of true ‘animal independence’ (of any human paradigm: biology, ethology, philosophy, religion … ).

***

Fragmentary thoughts:

The border around the castle ‘HUMAN’ is the one of scientifical categorizing. Within the castle we claim to be ‘complete’.

BIOLOGICAL HIERARCHISM ALWAYS PUTS HUMAN ‘OBJECTIVITY’ ON TOP OF WHAT IT DENIES THE OTHER SPEICIES: THAT IS ON TOP OF ANIMALS’ OBJECTIVITY

How can absolute objectivity be captured? With which parameters to measure against? Humans’ objectivity claim relies on subjective interests.

Ethical behaviour is one of the components taken out of the frame of an allround objectivity.

Animals get denied for their actions to be viewed as not insinctual.

Subsequently the VALUES of behaviour get ruled out from being within the ethcial scale of social actions between the species, etc.

A term such as ‘ethical’ desribes something that is existent, it’s not an idea in itself – otherwise it would not exist in the correlations…

Mitfühlen oder die Frage nach dem Bösen

 

Im Zugen der Frage danach, ob man mit den Menschen, die Tiere töten oder töten möchten, oder meinen töten zu „müssen“, ob man mit diesen Menschen „mitfühlen“ sollte, sollte man sich aber auch fragen, warum soll ich hier nicht von einer „bösen“ Motivation sprechen. Warum soll ich Verständnis für etwas aufbringen, das auch mein Verständnis nicht zu einem Recht werden ließe.

Ich habe in letzter Zeit häufiger gelesen, dass man doch bitte Verständnis haben solle, mit denen, die Tiere wegen ihres „Fleisches“ oder ihrer „Nutzbarkeit“ töten (wollen). Das habe ich aber nicht im speziellen von Speziesisten gehört, sondern von Leuten, die Blogs über Tierrechte betreiben.

Die Frage nach dem „Bösen“ im Speziesismus ist also, und das mag überraschen, gar nicht eine, die so selbstverständlich gestellt wird. Man verurteilt zwar die Tiertötung und die Gewalt gegen Tiere, aber man diskutiert und analysiert nicht, warum die Tiertötung – von Seiten dessen, der sie begeht oder in Auftrag gibt –, nicht als eine so schwerwiegende Tat wie Mord klassifiziert werden kann ( – aus Gründen des Selbstschutzes natürlich, der scheinmoralischen Legitimation). Und das noch nicht mal von vielen Tierrechtlern.

Eine speziesistische Handlung ist sich dessen bewusst tierverachtend zu sein, aber das spezielle, an dieser Form der Diskriminierung gegen ein anderes Lebewesen ist, dass man es hier mit einer Diskriminierungsform zu tun hat, die einerseits „böse“ motiviert ist – sie will dem Opfer schaden – aber andererseits schafft diese Form der Oppression sich einen Freibrief, indem sie die Gravität ihrer Gewalt als Nichtigkeit verhüllt.

Wenn nun aber auch gerade noch die, die eigentlich gegen diese Form der Gewalt vorgehen wollen, denken, man müsse den Tätern, den spezisitsich handelnden, begegnen, indem man ihnen mit Verständis und Mitfühlsamkeit einen Raum der Legitimität schafft, dann erreicht der Speziesismus genau das was er will: er gibt sich als eine wertneutrale Realität menschlichen Denkens aus, und nicht als Verstoß gegen ein ursächliches Moralempfinden, das die Aufgaben hat, Recht zu schützen, zu verteidigen und überhaupt ethische Schutzräume zu postulieren.

Aus dem Vegan*Swines Reader IV (2012): Der Mythos der „humanen“ Art der Ausbeutung und Tötung von Tieren

Der Mythos der „humanen“ Art der Ausbeutung und Tötung von Tieren

Diese Informationen basiert auf Erfahrungswerten von Tierrettungs- bzw. schutzhöfen und den Recherchen bekannter Tierrechts- bzw. schutzorganisationen. Die Angaben beziehen sich auf die Realität in westeuropäischen und US-amerikanischen Agrarbetrieben.

Eine „humane“ Umgehensweise sollte eigentlich bedeuten, mit Respekt und Einfühlungsvermögen mit den Lebewesen umzugehen, die auf unsere Hilfe angewiesen sind. Es ist egal, ob es dabei um Menschen oder um Tiere geht. Das, was wir genau unter „humanen“, also menschlichen Werten verstehen, läßt darauf zurückschließen, auf welchem Level sich der gegenwärtige Aufgeklärtheitsstatus unserer Kultur befindet.

Würden wir die gleichen Methoden, die wir in der Aufzucht, Versorgung, und Tötung von Farmtieren praktizieren, auf unsere Haustiere anwenden, dann wäre das gesetzeswidrig und jeder normale Mensch würde so eine Behandlungsweise von Tieren als erschreckend und grausam empfinden … diesen Text als PDF lesen / downloaden (Link öffnet sich in einem neuen Fenster)

Three questions I would like to ask any true animal advocate

Why we eat “farm animals”, and why we let our “pets” be mass euthanized?

http://www.carnism.com < = ? = > http://www.nokilladvocacycenter.org

Why do we think we are animal lovers, when we don’t take the sides of nonhuman animals consistently?

my two cents > http://simorgh.de/niceswine/tag/homocentrism

An Animal Rights revolution, acknowledging a new open view onto the animal kingdom or sticking with the biologistic instinct paradigm.

Why we think “infighting” is bad, when it’s only part of any democratic process?

The recent “infighting” debate between proponents of the “welfarist” and the “abolitionist” view (and the shades of gray inbetween them) shows us just how important allowing pluralist views is for the debate and the practice in our shared goal to help, support, rescue, defend … nonhuman animals .

Yet also we can see how important it is to separate between: priorities for advancing causes and (what I’d call) agenda talk.

Both sides see themselves as being more realistic about the right way in which to approach the general public. Since tragically the general public are still more or less analphabetic as what regards any consciousness of how to bring our animal cospecies constructively (in a life-affirming way) into the political arena of a democracy in crisis ( – the state we are obviously in – but this is a chance, when we take a deep look at the causes for the democratic crisis!).

Animal welfare and animal rights will have to merge into a concept, I believe, that should be wider than an exclusionary sum. The main points to rethink are, I think:

A stronger differentiation in the argumentation is needed often. For instance: what are the goals of welfare? I don’t want to sound funny, but do you still remember the axioms of the set theory? Where do both sides meet, on which grounds, and where do they totally exclude each other … ?

Realistically, how much is “strategy” and how much is “justice” in welfarism: It might be strategically mostly the main option to work on phasing out the speciesist realities and atrocities, but it’s not just. So we got both aspects at one instance, the aspect of being only “strategic”, the slow progress of welfarism – if it has the goal of eliminating speciesism in the end, and the “just” way of abolishing the enslavement of nonhuman animals for human purposes overall, at the other hand.

Goals should be revealed openly if they don’t meet the optimal ends for nonhuman animals in a direct way, such as is the case in welfarism: a tough question, because obviously to do the optimal for animals, we have to do the optimal for nature and humans too, because everything is interwoven on the different layers (and with the optimal for humans being a current issue of open debate or mute silence in our societies.)

Political strategies in the animal rights and the animal welfare movement should be explained, rather than to draw nice images of either the future (abolitionist tendency somehow) or the present (welfarist claims of success where the goal is forgotten over that): why do we deal with nonvegans and non animal advocates the way we do, why do we talk to them the way we talk to them, how do we see the public as so hard to approach on a more honest and critical level?

We do have to have infights, indirectly and partly, cos of our wrangle about the right tone to meet the “general public” … maybe

Why can’t we talk openly towards each other and the other people in society?

Finally: If we would discuss everything more critical and to a deeper level, we would be able to dig our way through ages of history in which we have learned and maybe wanted to distance ourselves from animals and nature.

 

Common sense as a basis for morality in Animal Rights

Use your sense of justice, when you judge nonhuman animals, use your common sense, when you judge animals.

When natural scientist make findings about how an animal brain works, how animal psychology works, cognition, consciousness, it means they will do 1. invasive research at some point, and 2. they will be using parameters that are strictly homoncentric, meaning the frame of reference they apply moves only within a “human” framework of “objectivity”.

A real Animal Rights revolution would require people to step back from human parameters. A real Animal Rights revolution would mean we as humans are able to face nonhuman animals on the level where we allow them to be different but still respect their untouchable integrity in this natural world that we all live in and are born into.

When we want to give nonhuman animals our definitions, we should as Animal Rights people make sure we don’t impose a worldview onto them and their concerns, that is not theirs (and thus not in THEIR interest). If we can’t accept that animals have their own views of the world, then we deny them real and autonomous subjectivity, and then we deny them personhood in a sense that we should respect.

We don’t need scientific proof and scientific arguments, what we need is to learn to accept common sense as a basis for morality and moral judgment in Animal Rights issues as much as we accept our basic common sense to be enough when we talk about each other or internal human concerns.

 

Vegan for justice

Not the plain awareness that “eating meat is wrong”, but a growing sense of justice makes veganism so attractive to people I think.

Ok this is a fine line, but I believe what makes people want to turn vegan now, is not that “by chances” they have been informed about the atrocities going on in farms and slaughterhouses and that more or less right away turns them into vegetarians and/or vegans. I think it’s rather the growing sense of justice as far as nonhuman animals are concerned and the human relationship towards them, that makes people get the “click” of becoming a vegan.

People find it easier to stand for what they feel and think today, in regards to nonhuman animals.

In the past when you thought it was wrong to eat “meat”, etc. the pressure around a person living in a homocentrist society was so strong that someone was confronted with so many more obstacles than the obstacles a persons meets today in most or at least many contexts and places.

The danger of thinking that solely information would almost automatically create a more enlightened and thus hopefully compassionate people all around us, lays in the often overlooked point that many meat eaters and hunters, for example, etc., are acting fully knowing what they are doing and endorsing their fully aware chosen stances publicly wherever they can as individuals “having something to do with the issue” (they feel being asked for their warped views, so much, I think). The same fanaticism about a practiced carnism and speciesism also goes for some people in the field of arts it has to be noted – a professional field that is in much danger of acting on an ideological plane in society anyway and speciesist art is a sad fact that is often being ignored way too much ( speciesism in art : http://www.farangis.de/blog/category/animalistic-issue ).

What I think is important, is that we don’t underestimate the will and the power of the individual person and society overall to foster a sense of justice in each other once the ice is broken that sealed (one could say) “the lips of humanity” in the past.

the “personal choice” debate and homocentrism

As much as I like the cons of the article:

http://freefromharm.org/food-and-psychology/five-reasons-why-meat-eating-cannot-be-considered-a-personal-choice/

I find the “pros” partly a bit superficially treated.

Point 1. homocentrists and speciesist don’t care really wheather it’s “unnecessary” today to eat flesh. It’s about sacrificing life. Like “my human life is worth more than … “.

Point 2. Again, underlying mechanisms in society are overlooked when we hold back in as much that veganism (or rather not wanting to take part in animal murder in any form) is solely a choice of personal decision. The part of neseccisty on the side of “what human rights lose in a speciesist society” would need to be addressed for instance.

Point 3. It needs to be explained why a nonhuman animal victim isn’t even considered a victim by a speciesist or homocentrist respectively. “No being who prides himself on rationality can continue to support such behaviour.” Exactly that is the problem, they say that just because they are “rational” they are allowed to kill for their taste buds, etc.

Point 4. The destructivity of meat eating has the speciality that it does not care that it destroys the earth AND other humans (partly direclty) too … . To believe in the false cloak of a “humanity” that bases itself on speciesism and homocentrism, means to fall for a dangerous contractualism:

I don’t buy that people really in a basic sense accept even other humans rights. They don’t even accept my human right for example that I consider nonhuman animals to be rights holders as personalities too. So to believe that a person basically has a sense for “rights” but only applies it to her or his group seems wrong to me, BECAUSE this would be ONLY a contractualism, but with the claim for animal rights we are looking for the basic, fundamental rights to life, and earth-/ independent environmental rights, etc.

Point 5. here again it should be highlighted more or at all how animal rights and humans rights are intertwined – in a positive sense.

Otherwise I find it good and always highly due to discuss the issue of rights, in particular and foremostly animals rights and human “personal” choices!

An e-memorial and about people who simply deny that their harboring speciesist attitudes when you confront them …

The grave site of Martin Eduard Staudinger, German Animal Rights advocate and anti-vivisectionist. His grave is on the Hauptfriedhof in Frankfurt am Main, Germany. He shares a grave site with his grandmother Dorothea Staudinger geb. Behrends.

On a memorial site for the people who lie resting on the Hauptfriedhof his grave is mentioned as:
“146 Grabmal für Martin Eduard Staudinger (1842-1910), Kämpfer gegen die Vivisektion, Gewann C 59” (http://www.bomas.de/buecher/brauchitsch-frankfurt.htm , accessed on the 16.08.12)

The inscription on his tombstone reads:’Im unermüdlichen Kampfe gegen die Vivisektion und für die Rechte der Tiere’ = In the untiresome fight against vivisection and for the rights of animals. (http://ar-civet-cat.blogspot.de/2010/07/martin-eduard-staudinger-1842-1910.html)

People that pretend not to know what speciesism is, and how to deal with them?

Honestly I don’t know yet, I am still trying to find ways … . Have you encountered that problem too: you make a somewhat halfwitted and half-conscious speciesist aware about the fact that you disagree with them making speciesist remarks (when you are around or not directly around on social networks maybe. People like to do it more so when an AR person is somewhere close by, so that a direct verbal argument can start, or so that they can try to ridicule your stance face to face and in public)?

Telling someone that you are against speciesism can be dealt with by a speciesist with a form of denial as a “response”, in which the person just assumes not to know what you’re talking about. Partly anybody is aware of speciesism, partly not. A speciesist is likely (at least in these days still) not fully aware of this -ism that humans direct against the nonhuman animal world (that is, speciesism!). A person might be aware about the conscious degradation of nonhuman animals, but might not consider that as a form of oppression that he or she should take politically serious in a considerate form. So we deal with an ethical blindness in many speciesists.

So how can one address them?

Overall it can be reasonable in the most cases to go ahead and still tell someone what you roughly think about the human-nonhuman relation in our societies in general. On the other hand, when you feel that informing that person won’t lead to any useful effect for the cause, you can just try to ignore their ignorance (!) and just “stand for what you stand” – let them know you are a vegan anti-speciesist, but not argue with them -, because your stance (in thought an action) will have all kinds of effects on your environment anyway.

I’m trying both these approaches anyway.

Boycott all forms of speciesist exploitation …

I am clearly against KFC, cos I am a vegan.

Here is a new (I guess?) campaign by Greenpeace against them: http://www.kfc-secretrecipe.com/en_us/nogood.

What about the birds that kfc massmurders? If we are trying to mend something, we should not stop at the hardest part of the problem, I believe.

Fragment … thoughts on what we think are “atrocities”

Atrocities

We all think we know what atrocities are, and yes we do know – as people, as human beings – what the worst types of atrocities are. However, we fail to acknowledge the full extent of the psychological mindset in humans who cause such actions we consider to be “crimes against humanity” or the murder of an individual or several or many, many human beings.

The type of mindset that likes to destroy others for no reason but for the sake of hatred, is the same type of psyche that picks on any other living being too, in order to rule over it, in life and death.

As humans we have drawn a fence around that what is brutality against the natural world – humans excluded as the only protected and self-declared only species with culture and civilization. And whatever type of atrocities a human does within this spot: “nature”, is ok. We don’t even call that an atrocity then.

Humanity wants to have high moral values, but the basis on which this has to rest is exactly that very basis which destroys moral values. Humanism invented a circle that runs it itself ad absurdum.

Moral values do need a basis, and in reality they have a basis, and that is in the lived relation between human inasmuch and animals. My right as a human, is my right to defend what I perceive to be an animals right inasmuch. So this is my critique about humanism. A.) it fails to be logical as far as ethical reasoning is concerned in general and B.) it won’t allow me to think and act freely as soon as I want to cross the border out of the sterile world of human perspectives and philosophies of life.

Pain

You think you know what segregation means, and what it feels like. But go as a nonhuman animal into any designated human zone (basically every spot in the world), and you know what type of atrocity homocentrism is.

Human are animalcentric in that they focus on a total destructivity towards animals, both willing and unwilling. Animal culture is something human cultures have so much worked against, that being human in itself really is the anti-thesis to animal life. And humans try just so hard to be so very proud of that.

Humans want to emulate animals of prey, but they are just plain humans. We don’t know what the reason culturally is behind the animals of prey hunting other animals. But one thing is for sure, we as humans have another role and potential role. We can either fail and be enemies to the world, or we can see our own role and position made up of own and specific moral participatory values.

I don’t understand why people overall think and act in such highly undifferentiated ways when it comes to their stances on the human-animal relationship, when it comes to thinking about animal life and human life, and life in the universe over all.

However, humans all have to experience their life as own single individual beings, no matter how much they like to or have to hide in the human mass and no matter how much they fail to see the animal individual in what the human world senses to be the plain masses of animal life.

Living life as a single being confronts one with certain inevitable questions of the meaning and the purpose of ones own life. Look at the different meanings people seek out for themselves – all strings run together at a certain spot, and that spot is not to be found in any human-superiorist stratagems.